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Abstract
This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the
interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideol-
ogy. We introduce inequality-averse and ine¢ ciency-averse agents and analyze their
conict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers
with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate
a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing pri-
vate ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of
communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-o¤ between
equality and e¢ ciency at the scale of alternative economic systems. While our focus
is on the long-run transitions from capitalism to communism and back observed in
the course of the 20-th century, the model also derives conditions under which the
two systems converge and become stable.
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February 1848: The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims.
They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible
overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble
at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but
their chains. They have a world to win.Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Manifesto of the Communist Party.1
September 2010: There were many odd things about my recent Havana
stopover [...] but one of the most unusual was Fidel Castros level of self-
reection. [...] I asked him if he believed the Cuban model was still something
worth exporting. The Cuban model doesnt even work for us anymore,he
said. Je¤rey Goldberg, Fidel: Cuban Model Doesnt Even Work for Us
Anymore,The Atlantic.2
1 Introduction
Communism was the grand experiment of the 20-th century. It also seems to have been
its grand illusion. In terms of utopian vision, radical implementation and socioeconomic
impact, communism has left a lasting mark in history. Its rise and fall as a possible al-
ternative to capitalism is a complex and multi-faceted theme, interpreted from di¤erent
theoretical and methodological perspectives in social sciences. Works from many disci-
plines, going beyond politics and economics, have tried to portray or, more ambitiously,
explain the various manifestations of communism across the map of the world  from
nascent and militant through mature and oppressive into stagnating and decaying.
So why another attempt to reconsider the key driving mechanisms behind the genesis
of the revolutionary communist project and the gradual mass disillusionment with its
realities? This paper aims to study how the economic system a¤ects the evolution
of beliefs and preferences through the endogenous socialization e¤orts of the various
social classes. Can this lead to cycles in economic systems, if a system gradually builds
opposition to itself? To analyze these questions, we rely on economic theory to examine
the interactive dynamics of economic incentives and social preferences through cultural
transmission.
In what follows, we build a tractable model to formalize the role of socioeconomic
factors in the process that led to the advent of communism via a forced revolution
and nationalization of capital, as well as its reversal back to markets. In essence, this
grand experiment has led to a trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency in terms of
productivity and saving at the scale of alternative economic systems.3 Our theoretical
account of the rise and fall of communism, from the revolutionary enthusiasm of Marx
and Engels through the disillusionment of Castro quoted above, is framed as a stylized
game of class struggle involving economic decisions and transmission of ideology across
generations. This is along the lines of North (2005), who interprets the experience with
communism in Russia as a story of perceived reality! beliefs! institutions! policies
1Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Oppo-
sition Parties, translated by Samuel Moore in cooperation with Frederick Engels, 1888,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch04.htm
2http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/del-cuban-model-doesnt-even-work-
for-us-anymore/62602/
3For instance, Stretton (1976) writes: Equalities can always be ill-designed, or enforced by oppressive
methods. When they are, they may reduce productivity, as well as freedom. Some communist countries
have attened their margin for skill or hard work too far, with apparently bad e¤ect on economy
e¢ ciency.
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! altered perceived reality and on and on(p. 4).4 The model also shows conditions
under which communism remains stable that can explain the persistence and the success
of the Chinese social market economy.
While the chain of logic by North is framed along purely descriptive argumentation
in the tradition of the new institutional economics, it is certainly compatible with a
learning perspective formalized in works such as Piketty (1995) and Buera et al. (2011).
Recent evidence has however uncovered the role of indoctrination (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln, 2007) and history (Roland, 2009) in this phenomenon. Interestingly, recent
empirical studies also provide direct evidence on the intergenerational transmission of
beliefs and cultural resilience. These include Patacchini and Zenou (2011) on religion,
and Klasing (2011) and Dohmen et al. (2012) on attitudes towards risk and trust and
how they interact with changes in institutions.
We therefore emphasize the role of socialization and the transmission of preferences,
social norms, and beliefs, following a strand of literature stemming from Bisin and
Verdier (2001) that explores the role of intergenerational transmission of attitudes to
explain the persistence of socioeconomic status across generations.5 Our goal is to show
how this same mechanism can paradoxically lead to a pendulum-like swing between
economic systems. Only few theoretical works focus on the interrelation between the
intergenerational transmission of ideological preferences and institutional change. The
closest to our work is Döpke and Zilibotti (2008), which studies the role of the inter-
generational transmission of taste for leisure and patience in the success of institutional
changes brought about by the industrial revolution. Also, Saint-Paul (2010) analyzes
the impact of the evolution of beliefs about the workings of the market economy on
ideological bias in the society and political reform.
The incentive structure under the two economic systems is captured in our model by
the (mis)alignment of ownership and control. This is in line with the large literature on
the key weaknesses of socialism: one strand dealing with the pervasive problems arising
from the soft budget constraints of socialist enterprises (e.g., Kornai, 1980) what
Roemer (2008) labels lack of incentives; another pointing to the overambitious task
of central planning, given dispersed and local information, to ensure better allocative
decisions than markets (e.g., von Hayek, 1940, 1945) what Roemer (2008) labels lack of
coordination. Our approach highlights these two familiar disadvantages of a communist
economy at their crucial link, the intertemporal optimization decision, at which the
(mis)alignment of ownership and control manifests itself. The choice of consumption
and accumulation out of ones own wealth given the signals of competitive markets and
locally relevant information under capitalism sustains e¢ ciency but generates inequality.
Delegating this choice to an egalitarian planner forces equality by revolution but erodes
economic e¢ ciency, thus making everyone equal in their poverty.6
In this paper, we combine the above lines of thought and use the transmission and
evolution of preferences to shed light on the dynamics of regime switches across eco-
nomic systems. We devise a non-cooperative game between agent types that takes place
in every period of an overlapping-generations (OLG) framework to demonstrate how the
equilibrium strategies drive the long-run socioeconomic dynamics and can generate such
4This view somewhat departs from earlier seminal works on communism versus capitalism, and related
studies on the comparative e¢ ciency of the two systems. Among many others, see Lange (1956 [1936]),
von Hayek (1940, 1945), Tinbergen (1960), Lancaster (1973), Kornai (1980), Roemer (1980, 1985).
5See Bisin and Verdier (2010) for a thorough survey of the literature on cultural transmission and
socialization that followed.
6Note that we ignore neither that inequalities were de facto existing in communist countries, nor
that they were creating resentment (see, e.g., Joo, 2005). However, considering explicitly the nomen-
klatura would only complicate the model without changing the substance of the results (in e¤ect, only
accelerating the swing back from plan to market).
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pendulum-like switch from markets to an egalitarian economy abolishing private own-
ership, and back to rebuilding market incentives to sustain society. We focus on a large
region of the world where capitalism was less developed and, perhaps more importantly,
any democratization of the society was avoided or much delayed.
In particular, we model two types of agents, inequality-averse and ine¢ ciency-averse
ones, responding to economic incentives and transmitting their values as they are a¤ected
by evolving economic outcomes. We rst show how capital accumulation by the minority
elite and the resulting inequality leads to increasing social discontent over time and,
eventually, the overthrow of the system. We then show how a centrally-planned system
aimed at equality also fades away due to misalignment of individual incentives and
aggregate targets, lower well-being and the gradual redirection of ideas towards a market
system. The economic literature, and the literature on communism or social evolution
more generally, has not provided so far a consistent theory on the institutional change
experienced by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries in Eastern Europe throughout
the 20-th century accounting for both these transitions. In this consists the contribution
of our stylized but history-based formal analysis of the rise and fall of communism and
the conditions under which a planning and a market sytem converge and stabilize.
We support our results and the underlying assumptions by providing a number of
related historical (anecdotal and empirical) evidence in the relevant world regions. In
so doing, we focus on the bifurcation of the transition path observed in Russia and
China. The transmission dynamics of our model also match some of the ndings of
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who explore the possibility of a feedback e¤ect from
communism on preferences by assessing the dynamics of support for state intervention
among individuals in East Germany compared to those in West Germany. Looking at
the preferences of di¤erent age groups after the reunication, they nd state support
to be higher in some areas for the age group whose older generation lived most of their
lives before the start of communism. Support then decisively fell from one generation
to the next for subsequent age groups who lived under communism.7 We also present
and discuss evidence on the incentive problem faced in centrally planned economies
compared to those in which agents were free to choose output targets as well as means
to meet them. Among others, Bergson (1991) provides gures on the remarkably lower
output and consumption per worker in the USSR compared to the rest of the world.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct our model,
presenting the types of agents, their objectives, constraints, ideological conict, and the
transmission of their beliefs across generations. Section 3 then solves the optimization
problems of the agent types and the von Stackelberg game they play every period.
Section 4 derives the intergenerational dynamics and highlights the resulting economic
outcomes in terms of regime transitions or stability. Section 5 situates our theory in
historical context, justifying the key assumptions we employ. The last section concludes
by summarizing the insights from our model and draws parallels between our ndings
and the related literature.
2 The Model
2.1 Economic Systems, Agent Types and Conict
We consider two economic systems under which society can evolve: one is based on the
market (capitalist), denoted by M , and the other on an egalitarian planner (commu-
nist), denoted by E. True to the historical genesis of communist ideas, our analysis
begins with a market-based system founded upon property rights over the means of pro-
7See Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007): Figure 1, p. 1516.
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duction and the corresponding private incentives to capital accumulation. Our interest
is in a particular region that at some point in time splits apart and experiments with
communism. Its total adult population is normalized to 1.
There are two types of agents in the initial capitalist society. The large majority are
born without inheriting capital: they are the workers. They are unprivilegedin the
sense that they can only sell their labor force in the market in order to subsist, as Marx
argued. Being the have-nots, they care about inequality in the capitalist society, whose
victim they are by birth. We call them inequality-averse agents and denote their type
as A. A minority of agents are born with inherited capital: they are the capitalists.
They extract rents from their private capital, and care about the relative ine¢ ciency
between the two systems. We call them ine¢ ciency-averse agents and denote their type
as B.8
Initially, types (A and B) and classes (workers and capital owners) coincide, by
denition. In a conventional way, this can be interpreted in terms of the class struggle
between capital and labor. However, over time preference types evolve, so that class and
preference type diverge. We consider an OLG model, where agents live for two periods.
During childhood (in the rst period of life), they are socializedacquiring a particular
type when they become adult. When mature (in the second period of life), they perform
active economic and ideological roles in the society, and die at the end of the period,
investing any capital wealth they have accumulated.
Under both systems, M and E, economic power belongs to the preference type who
decides upon and enforces the intertemporal allocation between capital accumulation
and consumption. The other preference type can then only try to change the economic
system through ideological inuence. We denote the degree of strength of each type
relative to the other by the conict function qt () and 1   qt (), respectively for types
A and B in any period t, and measure it by an index, 0 < qt () < 1. More precisely,
this index can be dened to be some increasing function of the relative intensity of
the preference itself (social resentment or ideological determination), 0 < mt < 1, and
the relative size (or fraction) of each preference type in the total adult population,
0 < nt < 1: 0 < qt (mt; nt) < 1, with
@qt()
@mt
> 0 and @qt()@nt > 0. It also captures the
probability of a regime shift in any period t.
2.2 Preferences
The lifetime utility of agent i for i = A;B under each system j =M;E takes the form
U i(cij;t; u
i
j;t+1; 
i
t) = c
i
j;t + u
i
j;t+1  
 
 it
2
2
; (1)
where cij;t is the individual consumption level and
uij;t+1(b
i
j;t+1; t+1; t+1) = ln b
i
j;t+1   Eit [t+1; t+1] (2)
with bij;t+1 denoting the utility from savings that generate next-period income by
individuals under market (yBM;t+1) and the state under communism (Yt+1).
9 Agents also
experience disutility in terms of relative status with respect to other individuals or the
other system, depending on their type. More precisely, EAt [t+1] and E
B
t [t+1] are the
8See also Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2000) and Olcina and Peñarrubia (2004) for alternative explana-
tions of the agent types.
9 It will be made clear below that the same results obtain both qualitatively and quantitatively if the
bequest term bij;t+1 is replaced by next-period consumption c
i
j;t+1.
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expected regime-dependent inequality and ine¢ ciency
EAt [t+1] = qt+1 ln E;t+1 + (1  qt+1) ln M;t+1; (3)
EBt [t+1] = qt+1 lnE;t+1 + (1  qt+1) lnM;t+1; (4)
where j;t+1 measures income of type B relative to A, or inequality within the society
as perceived at t, and j;t+1 the relative e¢ ciency of individual optimization under free
market over a centrally-planned economy in terms of productivity and potential growth
possibilities as perceived at t. Note that communism forcefully proclaims complete
equality in the society, E = 1, yielding ln E = 0. Similarly, ine¢ ciency is initially
normalized under capitalism, M = 1, and so lnM = 0. M;t and E;t will be dened
further below. The relative strength of the preference types, qt+1, determines the prob-
ability of a regime change in period t+1. Finally, utility depends on costly socialization
e¤ort functions  it, with 0   it  1, to be discussed in section 2.5.
The semi-log functional form places a trade-o¤ between the utility and disutility
brought by events in t+1 from capital accumulation and the risk that the group with a
di¤erent ideology takes control of the society, respectively. For capitalists, this implies
altruistic bequests to their o¤spring versus the possibility of the latter living in a less
e¢ cient system. For an egalitarian planner, the trade-o¤ arises between building capital
in order to maximize output from one generation to the next, and losing the centralized
system to an unequal society.
2.3 Production and Income
We consider a one-sector real model where a single good is produced using a constant-
returns-to-scale linear technology. The output produced at time t in regime j is
Hj;t = Aj [Kj;t + j;t(1  )L] (5)
for j =M;E and depends on two productive factors, capital Kj;t depreciating fully dur-
ing t and labor L supplied inelastically by households. Total factor productivity (TFP)
under each regime is denoted by Aj . Labor-augmenting productivity is measured by
j;t  (c) and is determined by the incentives of workers. We approximate these incen-
tives by material well-being based on consumption in workersfamilies. Furthermore,
0(c) > 0 represents the incentive of workers as a function of consumption, and 00(c) < 0
implies that productivity gains are decreasing. The relative importance of capital and
labor in producing output are denoted by  and 1 , respectively. Under competitive
factor markets, returns to labor and capital can then be written as
wM;t = AM (1  )M;t
and
rM;t = AM:
Both factor returns are j-indexed, because of the potentially di¤erent productivity levels
under the two systems.
We consider a subsistence consumption level c, never reached by the A type so that
only capital owners can invest. In the market system, income of capital owners and
workers in each period is respectively
yBM;t = rM;ts
B
t 1 = AMs
B
t 1; (6)
where sBt 1 is savings in the previous period, and
yAM;t = wM;t = AM (1  )M;t: (7)
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Under communism, as capital is nationalized and capitalists are deprived of their
ownership, investment decisions are no longer individual but made by the egalitarian
planner. As a consequence, individual income becomes a centralized allocation of an
equal share of output to each member of the society as wages, which are not necessarily
equal to the marginal product of labor:
yBE;t = y
A
E;t = wE;t: (8)
Note that in this case the whole population, including B types, forms the working class
(cAE;t = c
B
E;t = cE;t = wE;t).
We dene perceived income inequality arising from saving by capitalists in period t
as the relative income from capital versus that from labor:
M;t+1
yBM;t+1
yAM;t+1
=

1  
sBt
M;t+1
; (9)
where imposing the initial condition yBM;0 > y
A
M;0 prevents a capitalist from switching
types and becoming a worker.
2.4 Savings and E¢ ciency
A capitalist, type B, chooses individual savings (which we denote by lowercase sBt ) to
maximize utility in (1) given the budget constraint
cBt + s
B
t  yBM;t: (10)
The timing of events during the accumulation process is as follows: the savings
of the previous period, sBt 1, comprise the private capital stock in the present period,
kM;t, which will then be put into production given (5). The private yields from capital
ownership yBM;t = rM;tst 1 generated through the production process are nally divided
between consumption cBt and savings s
B
t (forming the future capital stock, kM;t+1).
An egalitarian planner instead maximizes utility (1) in the name of the type A agents
under the national budget constraint
Ct + St  HE;t: (11)
The savings decision by the planner di¤ers from private ones in that aggregate val-
ues are considered (which we denote by uppercase St). The same timing holds for the
accumulation process under the communist regime: St 1 comprises Kt, which is used
for national production along with labor and yields Yt = rE;tSt 1. Total output, HE;t,
is then allocated between further savings, St, and aggregate consumption in the soci-
ety, Ct, divided equally among all agents via identical wages assigned to all workers,
wE;t = cE;t. Note that under communism there is no market price of capital, therefore
rE;t is the shadow price of capital referred to in period t by the planner.
We can now dene the (inverse) ine¢ ciency index of the communist system, E;t+1,
in terms of perceived relative growth potential of the two regimes by means of savings
or capital formation and labor productivity
E;t+1
AM S^tM;t+1
AEStE;t+1
; (12)
where St is savings by the egalitarian planner, and S^t a notional value of aggregate
savings under a free market system referred to by individuals. Hereafter, we normalize
M = 1 as the productivity ceiling without loss of generality. As workers are paid their
marginal product under markets, they do not su¤er the incentives problems that occur
under communism, discussed in the upcoming sections.
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2.5 Intergenerational Transmission of Beliefs
We assume that type A agents always teach a communist ideology to their children
to abolish inequality, while type B agents always teach a pro-market ideology favoring
e¢ ciency.10 This is a rst channel of transmitting beliefs that captures the inuence on
ideology intensity within the family, and corresponds to what is termed direct vertical
transmissionin the literature (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2010). The evolution over time
of the relative degree of ideological determination to change the status quo, however,
is also a¤ected outside the family. This second channel, known as oblique transmis-
sion, operates through the inuence on ideology intensity by peers and the broader
environment (see also Saint-Paul, 2010).
We assume a setting, where direct vertical transmission acts as a substitute to oblique
transmission, i.e. parents have less incentives to socialize their children the more widely
dominant are their traits in the society. Socialization e¤orts 0   i ()  1 a¤ect
the determination of the next generation to mobilize in order to change the system.
Socialization e¤ort by type A is generated by resentment from inequality, At  A(),
and for type B by the inferior e¢ ciency with respect to markets Bt  B(). The
properties of these socialization functions are standard:
 it(1) = 0; 
i 0
t () > 0;  i 00t () < 0: (13)
Property  it(1) = 0 in (13) states that socialization e¤ort is only activated upon
su¤erance.11
The socialization process of the agents of each type, A and B, can be summarized
as follows: the transition probabilities at time t, P i"t , that a parent of type i has a child
with a stronger (") or weaker (#) ideological determination can be written as
PA"t = 
A
t + [1  At ]qt;
PA#t = [1  At ] (1  qt) ;
PB"t = 
B
t + [1  Bt ] (1  qt) ;
PB#t = [1  Bt ]qt: (14)
Given these transition probabilities, the relative strength of individuals of type A in
period t+ 1 is
qt+1 = qtP
A"
t + (1  qt)PB#t
= qt + (qt   q2t )[A()  B()]: (15)
The dynamics of the probability of a regime shift are endogenous to the present economic
situation and depend on the disutility experienced by each type. The properties of the
socialization functions imply that A() = 0 under communism while B() = 0 under
a market economy. Accordingly, the law of motion in (15) simplies to
qM;t+1 = qM;t + (qM;t   q2M;t)At (16)
10Landier et al. (2008) nd empirically that ideological priors matter a lot in attitude formation.
11This is a special case of Bisin and Verdier (2001) that is based solely on resentment towards the
status quo, i.e. only one agent type at a time engages in the transmission of his preferences. The use of
this setting allows us to simplify our notation, without changing our results under cultural substitution.
A Cournot setting also yields the same outcome as resentment and, hence, e¤ort by an agent living
under a regime s/he does not support is strategically higher.
Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (December 2012) 9
under markets and to
qE;t+1 = qE;t   (qE;t   q2E;t)Bt (17)
under communism.
Thus, in the market system the degree of ideological determination of type A to
change the status quo, qM;t+1, increases with any positive socialization e¤ort by type
A, A() > 0. Analogously, in the communist system the ideological determination of
type B to change the status quo increases, i.e. 1   qE;t+1 increases, with any positive
socialization e¤ort by type B, B() > 0.
3 Economic Systems and Interaction of Agents
We consider a sequencing of actions appropriate for both economic systems. The agent
type who exercises ownership and control (economic power) to decide on the split be-
tween consumption and savings moves rst. The other agent type can only have so-
cialization (or ideological) power by instilling beliefs against the regime in force. The
sequence of events at time t is illustrated in Figure 1 parallel to the process of capital
accumulation in the same period (see Section 2.4).
[Figure 1 about here]
3.1 Market-Based Economy
In the market system, capital owners control the allocation of their income between
consumption and savings, to be invested and used to produce in the next period by
the next generation. In contrast, workers do not own and control anything apart from
their labor force, which they supply inelastically in the model. It is therefore optimal
savings and capital accumulation within the capitalist dynasties, where ownership and
control rights are aligned and e¤ective, that drives the e¢ ciency and sustainability of
the market system but deepens the social inequality.
Type B agents in this case are the rst movers in a von Stackelberg leadership game
and decide on savings, while taking into consideration in their maximization problem
the socialization reaction of type A agents to the inequality caused by their own savings.
Starting with type A agents (the working class), they take savings as xed and maximize
their utility using (1):
max
At
UAM;t () = cAM;t   EAt [t+1]| {z }
(1 qt+1) ln M;t+1
  (
A
t )
2
2
;
where we have substituted for EAt [t+1] from (3) after noting that ln E = 0. Replacing
for M;t+1 from (9) and for qM;t+1 from (16), the optimization problem becomes:
max
At
cAM;t  

1  qt + qt(1  qt)At 	 ln 1  sBt

  (
A
t )
2
2
:
The rst-order condition yields the optimal reaction of type A as follower:
@UAM;t ()
@At
= qt(1  qt) ln


1  s
B
t

  At = 0
, At  = qt(1  qt) ln


1  s
B
t

: (18)
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This equation delivers a preliminary insight on the mechanisms that drive the evo-
lution from one system to another. An increase in private savings (by the capitalists)
leads to increased socialization e¤ort by type A agents. The latter can only expect a
growing inequality between the two types of agents, which reinforces their determina-
tion to instill their values in the next generation, and to potentially change the regime.
More precisely, the higher the expected inequality, the higher the e¤ort to transmit their
preferences towards a more equal society.
Turning to type B agents, they move rst by making a decision on the amount of
their savings:
max
sBt
UBM;t () = cBM;t + ln yBM;t+1   EBt [t+1] 
(Bt )
2
2
s.t. cBM;t + s
B
M;t  yBM;t:
Note that savings by capitalists have no direct negative externality on aggregate
productivity because the decision is made at an individual level and consumption by
workers cAM;t is not a¤ected by it. After a series of substitutions and omitting the M -
subscript to savings due to the absence of individual savings under communism in our
model, we rewrite
max
sBt
AMs
B
t 1   sBt + ln
 
AMs
B
t
  qt + (qt   q2t )At  ln  E;t+1 :
Replacing for At
 with the optimal reaction of type A agents from (18) and taking
the rst-order condition yields optimal savings by type B as leader,
@UBM;t ()
@sBt
=  1 + 1
sBt
  q
2
t (1  qt)2
sBt
ln
 
E;t+1

= 0
, sBt = 1  q2t (1  qt)2 ln
 
E;t+1

; (19)
where the second-order condition to ensure a maximum is always satised. The last
equation reveals that increased expected ine¢ ciency under the alternative (communist)
system induces lower accumulation by capital owners in an e¤ort to avoid a regime
change. Savings are also at their lowest level when the strength of the two types are not
too di¤erent so that q2t (1  qt)2 is near its maximum.
Substituting (19) back into (18) to derive the optimal socialization e¤ort of the type
A in its nal form, we get
At
 = qt(1  qt) ln


1  s
B
t

: (20)
Substituting At
 from (20) into (15), next-period ideological determination of type
A to change the status quo becomes
qt+1 = qt + q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln


1  s
B
t

: (21)
It is seen from (21) that the evolution of qt over time under a market system is
triggered when At
 > 0. This is true as long as
M;t+1(s
B
t ) 

1  s
B
t > 1; (22)
which holds as long as yBM;0 > y
A
M;0.
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Lemma 1 Given the initial condition yBM;0 > y
A
M;0, optimal individual savings by capital
owners sBt always increase inequality, provoking type-A workers into more intensive
transmission of their social discontent and more e¤ort to instigate a regime change.
Proof. See equation (22) where @M;t+1
@sBt
> 0 increases At
 in (20) and qt+1 in (21).
In sum, capital owners allocate their income between consumption and savings,
perpetuating inequality; workers then react by choosing their socialization e¤ort, which
in turn a¤ects the ideological determination and strength of the next generation to
change the status quo.
3.2 Centrally-Planned Economy
Under communism, the economic decisions are made by the egalitarian planner, who is
of type A and splits total consumption equally across all members of society.12 After the
nationalization following the communist revolution the society, de jure (but not de facto)
owning the capital, delegates control to the egalitarian planner. Individuals do not con-
trol the choice of aggregate consumption and investment out of national income, which
is also national output. Thus, under communism, there is misalignment of ownership
and control rights creating ine¢ ciency. We capture and interpret it in comparing the
optimization problems under central planning (aggregate, then disaggregated top-down
by equal split) vis-à-vis the market (individual, aggregated bottom-up).
The egalitarian planner is the rst mover and takes into consideration the social-
ization reaction of type B agents to the relative e¢ ciency of the system caused by his
centralized decision. Starting with type B agents (market advocates), they take savings
as xed and maximize:
max
Bt
UBE;t () = cBE;t   EBt [t+1]| {z }
qt+1 lnE;t+1
  (
B
t )
2
2
;
where we have substituted for EBt [t+1] from (4) after noting that lnM = 0. Replacing
for E;t+1 from (12) and for qE;t+1 from (17), the optimization problem becomes:
max
Bt
cBE;t  

qt + qt(1  qt)( Bt )
	
ln
 
AM S^t
AEStE;t+1
!
  (
B
t )
2
2
:
The rst-order condition then yields:
@UBE;t ()
@Bt
= qt(1  qt) ln
 
AM S^t
AEStE;t+1
!
  Bt = 0
, Bt  = qt(1  qt) ln
 
AM S^t
AEStE;t+1
!
: (23)
Hence, an increase in the planners aggregate savings directly reduces the socializa-
tion e¤ort by type B agents. This is due to the fact that, as seen in (12), such an increase
is perceived to give a boost to the e¢ ciency of the communist system. While this e¤ect
per se could reduce ine¢ ciency, it will be seen below that the command accumulation
12This follows our assumption of inequality aversion characterizing type A agents, to conform with
the preference for equality among the thinkers and pioneers of communism. Di¤erent from maximizing
social welfare, it presumes that the central planner himself experiences a disutility from inequality.
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process has an adverse e¤ect on labor productivity, leaving the total e¤ect of aggregate
savings on the relative e¢ ciency of the communist system and the socialization e¤ort
by type B agents ambiguous.13
The egalitarian planner as a rst mover maximizes utility in the name of the type
A agents taking into account aggregate values. Therefore, the egalitarian planner (not
individual capitalists, whose capital has been nationalized) optimally chooses the level
of aggregate savings, i.e. national investment. This also determines the allocation of
output to be distributed equally among the total population for consumption.
max
St
UAE;t() = Ct + lnYt+1   EAt [t+1] 
(At )
2
2
s.t. Ct + St  HE;t:
Parallel to the market economy, the planner takes Yt+1 as the value of the intergen-
erational transfer in his optimization problem using the shadow price of capital rE;t+1
(Yt+1 = rE;t+1St = AESt).
Aggregate decision making by an egalitarian planner under a communist regime
a¤ects total and per capita levels of consumption, therefore changing productivity over
time. This is because the national budget constraint implies Ct + St = HE;t, that is,
output in the aggregate has to be equal to the sum of consumption and investment in
every period. Therefore, each individual gets an identical consumption level equal to
the assigned allocation by the planner
cE;t =
HE;t   St
1
= Ct: (24)
Since allocation between saving and consumption takes place after production in each
period, consumption in t determines productivity in the following period t+1. There is
an externality caused by productivity being a function of consumption, which is changing
over time in the new economic system.
Lemma 2 The budget constraint of an egalitarian planner in (11), Ct + St = HE;t,
implies that higher aggregate savings cut consumption by the whole population. This
results in a negative e¤ect on productivity E;t+1 and makes the latter time-dependent.
Proof. We can conclude from (24) and the properties of E;t+1 that
@E;t+1
@St
=  @E;t+1
@Ct
=  @E;t+1
@cE;t
  0E;t+1 < 0:
After a series of substitutions, we obtain:
max
St
AE [St 1+E;t(1 )L] St+ln (AESt) 
 
1  qt   (qt   q2t )Bt  ln (M;t+1) :
Replacing for Bt with the optimal reaction curve by type B agents derived in (23)
and taking the rst-order condition yields:
13This ambiguity resembles historical evidence such as that in Broadberry and Klein (2011), who show
Czechoslovakias comparative productivity position under the central planning regime with respect to
the UK to have initially improved before falling back to lower levels.
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@UAE;t ()
@St
=  1 + 1
St
+ q2t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)
"
1
St
  
0
E;t+1
E;t+1
#
= 0
, St =
1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)
1 + ~E;t+1q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)
; (25)
where ~E;t+1 represents the perceived lagged semi-elasticity of labor productivity in
t+1 with respect to consumption in t, i.e.
0E;t+1
E;t+1
. In the rest of the analysis, we assume
imperfect information about the extent to which this value can be observed to analyze
the di¤erent consequences of a centralized regime.14
As observed from denition (12), aggregate savings, St , increases perceived inef-
ciency of communism relative to markets, E;t+1, when its direct positive e¤ect is
dominated by its negative e¤ect via productivity in the next period, E;t+1. In other
words, when the egalitarian planner increases St to trigger an acceleration of the ac-
cumulation process and a perceived fall in E;t+1, he must assign a lower consumption
level to all workers according to Lemma 2. Since productivity depends positively on
consumption in workersfamilies, next-period worker incentives and therefore produc-
tivity under communism, E;t+1, are reduced. If the latter e¤ect dominates, ine¢ ciency
increases and type B agents recruit intertemporally by intensifying their socialization
e¤ort.15
Lemma 3 Savings by the egalitarian planner increase ine¢ ciency if the direct positive
e¤ect on e¢ ciency is dominated by the indirect negative e¤ect via next period labor
productivity (
@E;t+1
@St
+
@E;t+1
@E;t+1
@E;t+1
@St
> 0), leading type B agents into more proliferation
of market ideas to instigate transition.
Proof. Ine¢ ciency in period t+ 1 increases if the direct positive e¤ect of saving in
t on e¢ ciency in t + 1 is dominated by its negative lagged e¤ect on labor productivity
via a reduction in E;t+1:
@E;t+1
@E;t+1| {z }
 
@E;t+1
@St| {z }
 
>

@E;t+1
@St| {z }
 
 ;
where we know @E;t+1@St < 0 from Lemma 2. This condition holds if and only if
0E;t+1
E;t+1
>
  1St

is true.
The results suggest that the central planner faces a trade-o¤ between building cap-
ital through saving to ensure output growth and causing ine¢ ciency in the subsequent
period by reducing labor productivity. He must sacrice consumption and next-period
14The ambiguity the central planner faces lies hidden in the productivity function. While the negative
dependence of productivity on lagged consumption is known, the magnitude of this e¤ect is uncertain,
implying that agents do not have perfect foresight, although they are e¤ectively rational in the context
of the game they play.
15Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) discuss the disincentive e¤ects on work of welfare-state arrangements,
stressing in particular that the negative e¤ects of the poor incentives for work in former socialist
countries in Eastern Europe also seem to have materialized with a time lag.
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productivity to save and increase output, which may lead to more discontent in the
society and an increased probability of transition. Solving out the inequality in Lemma
3 and replacing for optimal savings from (25) shows that in order for the lemma to hold
the condition
E;t+1 >
1 + ~E;t+1q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)
1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)
(26)
must be satised. Condition (26) suggests that savings made at an aggregate level
are more likely to increase ine¢ ciency the larger is the actual lagged impact of saving
on labor productivity and the smaller is that predicted by the central planner. This
would be in line with stylized facts provided in Brixiová and Bulíµr (2003) on how (i)
the planning authority did not know the true production function of individual rms
and their capacity utilization, and (ii) rms had vested interest to hide this information,
while the planner possessed only primitive monitoring technology. Knowing this and
without loss of generality, we set ~E;t+1 = 0 in the remainder of the analysis in order
to study the above-mentioned caveat of the communist system. Otherwise, a planner
with perfect information (~E;t+1 = E;t+1) will not undermine the sustainability of the
economic system, delaying or avoiding transition to markets.
With ~E;t+1 = 0, equation (25) becomes
St = 1 + q
2
t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1) ; (27)
where the second-order condition to ensure a maximum is always satised. It reveals
that increased expected inequality under the alternative (market) system induces higher
savings by the egalitarian planner in an e¤ort to further consolidate the capital stock
and, hence, the productive potential of the communist system. Savings can also be large
when the strength of the two types is not too di¤erent so that q2t (1   qt)2 is near its
maximum.
Substituting (25) back into (23) to derive the optimal socialization e¤ort of type B
in its nal form, we get
Bt
 = qt(1  qt) ln
 
AM S^t
AESt E;t+1
!
: (28)
And now substituting Bt
 from (28) into (15), the next-period proportion of the
population in favor of a market-based system becomes
qt+1 = qt   q2t (1  qt)2 ln
 
AM S^t
AESt E;t+1
!
: (29)
It immediately appears from (29) that the ideological stance of type As relative to
type Bs under the communist system weakens when Bt
 > 0. This is true as long as
E;t+1(S

t ) 
AM S^t
AESt E;t+1
> 1; (30)
which will turn out to be the initial condition at the moment of the communist revolu-
tion, T , due to destruction of some fraction of the capital stock (see section 3.3.1).
[Figure 2 about here]
Given condition (26) and hence Lemma 3, aggregate savings bring about ine¢ ciency
when either St or E;t+1 are su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, the concave nature
of labor-augmenting productivity as a function of consumption implies that the lagged
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negative e¤ect of savings on labor productivity is large when aggregate consumption
availability Ct is limited. This can, for example, be due to a large loss of capital caused
by the revolution and corresponds to the left region in Figure 2, where cE;t < c.
With a highly elastic response of labor productivity to savings, the planners choice
of savings in the preceding period leads to a lower e¢ ciency, an analogy to the instability
of communism in Lemma 3. We interpret the extent of this elasticity as the sacrice that
the population of the communist region is willing to endure in the name of an egalitarian
system, i.e. to what extent their working morale is reduced by lower consumption. This
tolerance may have to do with the cultural values, social norms, or strong ideological
conviction.
Thinking along such lines brings in an interesting parallel with the cross-cultural
psychology literature that allows us to compare Russia and Eastern Europe with China
and East Asia. Hofstede (2001) denes individualism versus collectivism as one of his
well-known cultural dimensions. In individualistic societies, people are expected to
pursue individual interests, whereas in collective societies they are expected to place
collective interests over personal ones. Indeed, Russia (estimated value) and the former
Eastern block countries score twice as much as China and other East Asian countries
on individualism. Such an analogy would, for instance, associate Russia and Eastern
Europe with a lower tolerance level and place it to the left of China and East Asia in
Figure 2.
Finally, recalling St = Kt+1 and substituting St into the production function in (5),
we get an expression for next period output in terms of optimal savings:
HE;t+1(S

t ) = AE



1 + q2t (1  qt)2 ln (M;t+1)

+ E;t+1(1  )L
	
: (31)
Equation (31) shows that a strong negative externality on productivity in Lemma
3 also prevents production HE;t in (5) from growing over time. This rules out the
possibility of investment creating higher consumption possibilities over time by raising
total output.16
In sum, the egalitarian planner allocates national income between consumption and
savings at the aggregate level. Type B agents react by choosing their socialization e¤ort
to inuence the ideology of the next generation, thus determining their share in the next
period, 1  qt+1.
3.3 Regime Switches and the Shift of Property Rights
3.3.1 The Moment of Revolution
Before analyzing the dynamics of capital accumulation, it is helpful to have a closer look
at the rst period immediately following the communist revolution, T . Aggregating all
capital stock in the hands of the individual capitalists, a proportion 1  nT of the adult
population, that has been nationalized at the beginning of T and taking into account
the costs of the revolution in terms of a destroyed fraction of capital, 0 < 1   T < 1,
we write:
sBT 1 = kT
revolution)
cost (loss)
TkT = KT : (32)
The left-hand side of this expression is the capital stock invested by the individual
capitalists just before the revolution and aggregated at the national level, sBT 1; the
right-hand side is the same capital stock after accounting for the capital losses during
16For an insight on the reduced consumption opportunities delivered by communist regimes, see for
example Bergson (1991).
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the revolution and the nationalization of all the inherited and surviving capital, TkT .
The latter capital stock, KT , is what remains for the egalitarian planner to put into
production in period T and, obviously, KT < kT . Note that productivity in T does
not change, leaving the planner with unchanged productivity, M , but a lower capital
stock, KT . This results in reduced output in T relative to T   1, inducing the planner
to increase savings in his very rst intertemporal allocation decision. Such a decision
could, of course, be motivated by the need to rebuild the capital base and compensate
for the loss from the revolution, or to catch up with the rest of the world.
From then on, in essence, period T has a lagged e¤ect on output in period T + 1
via two channels: increasing the capital stock, KT+1 = ST , through more savings in
the preceding period, (i) increases output, HT+1, but also (ii) decreases wages and
consumption that are equally assigned to all workers as from period T ; this reduces
working morale and, hence, productivity in the next period E;T+1 resulting in a lower
output HT+1. To sum up, if Lemma 3 holds, an elastic negative response of productivity
to savings across generations is ensured and communism is not sustainable in the long
run.
3.3.2 The Post-Communist Transition Period
By symmetry, it is also important to have a closer look into the rst period immediately
following the transition of the post-communist society back to a market-based system.
We assume that market transition takes place through a process of privatization of
the capital stock in the beginning of period T + N . The capital stock that has been
accumulated by that time, KT+N , is then allocated to the new capital owners, who now
have to manage it, by a legal change into property rights. Historically, several ways
of ownership transfer have been applied in post-communist transition economies, from
mass privatization, via restitution to the heirs of capitalists with nationalized factories,
to communist nomenklatura grabbing. In our context, it su¢ ces to assume without loss
of generality that the new capital owners will be the agents most eager to get into this
new role. Such agents may be of both types, as type As will be converting fast to
type Bs. We assume that at the beginning of period T + N , just after privatization,
the new capital owners represent a proportion 1   nT+N of the adult population. We
also assume that there will be certain costs of privatization in terms of the lack of
entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the new capital owners or because of inheriting
ine¢ cient or outdated enterprises and equipment. We measure these costs by a fraction,
0 < 1  T+N < 1, of lost capital, and we thus write:
ST+N 1 = KT+N
privatization)
cost (loss)
T+NKT+N = k
B
T+N : (33)
The left-hand side of this expression is the optimal savings, ST+N 1, invested into
capital stock, KT+N , by the egalitarian planner just prior to the transition to markets;
it is given directly at its aggregate national level (which also coincides in our model,
with a unit mass of adult population, with the per-capita mature-generation capital
stock). The right-hand side of (33) is the same capital stock after accounting for the
capital losses during the transition to markets and the privatization of all the inherited
and surviving capital, T+NKT+N . The latter capital stock, k
B
T+N , is what remains,
in the aggregate, to be allocated to the new capital owners and put into production
in period T + N , and kBT+N < KT+N . With this lower capital stock and productivity
in T + N predetermined by the lagged e¤ect of savings operating via consumption in
workersfamilies, E;T+N , output in T + N falls relative to T + N   1. Once the rst
period of the return to markets elapses, individual decision-making on the split between
consumption and savings by the new capital owners eliminates the negative externality
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in the intertemporal optimization problem, typical for communism, we highlighted. This
allows higher output in the next period and aligns invested savings with individually-
consistent decisions of capital owners. It also restores the higher level of consumption
characterizing the more e¢ cient market system, yet reintroducing and perpetuating
inequality.
4 Intergenerational Dynamics and Economic Outcomes
In this section, we highlight our principal analytical ndings derived from the dynamics
of qt and the resulting economic outcomes. That is, having analyzed the within-period
game equilibrium strategies of our two agent types, we now examine the feedback from
ideological strength qt to strategies across generations. Given that agents only live one
period of adulthood, players in the von Stackelberg game change every period. In other
words, the same game is played by the next generation, with the level of strength qt
attained by socialization of agents in the previous period as the initial condition. This
allows us to observe the law of motion of qt and potential economic transitions over
time.
4.1 Capitalism and the Communist Revolution
We rst consider the dynamics underlying the transition from a market-based to a
centrally-planned economic system. We can state:
Proposition 1 (Communist Revolution) Suppose the majority type A is initially
stronger than type B (q0 > 0:5). Given At
, sBt , and the law of motion of qt, the
optimal savings increase in qt (
@sBt
@qt
> 0). This implies that a higher qM;t+1 caused by
At
 will result in more savings by type Bs in the next generation von Stackelberg game
(
@sBt+1
@qt+1
> 0). As this trend continues, the probability of a communist revolution increases.
Proof of Proposition 1. We derive the e¤ect of the relative strength of workers
in some period t on the saving behavior of the capital owners in that period:
@sBt
@qt
= 2qt(1  qt)(2qt   1) ln
 
E;t+1
 < 0 if qt < 0:5
> 0 if qt > 0:5
: (34)
Thus, for any high qt > 0:5, we have
@sBt
@qt
> 0. In words, the optimal reaction functions
of the two types in the von Stackelberg game of class struggle under markets lead to a
progressive increase of qt. Type As become increasingly strong and ideologically deter-
mined to overthrow the existing capitalist social order. In each period t a communist
revolution may occur with probability qt.
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: starting from an initial condition q0 >
0:5, the mobilization of the working class caused by inequality increases the ideological
motivation of the next generation to overthrow the system. This induces more savings
by capital owners, but increases inequality, feeding the resentment of type A agents.
The reinforcing e¤ect of social resentment on capital accumulation and inequality could
eventually lead the market system towards its fall. Historically, this is relevant to the
case of the uprising of the working class in Russia, on which we focus the analysis.
4.2 Communism and the Transition to Markets
We turn to the dynamics underlying the transition from a centrally-planned to a market-
based economic system in another proposition:
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Proposition 2 (Market Transition) Observe from Proposition 1 that qT > 0:5 at
the moment of revolution and suppose Lemma 3 holds. Given Bt
, St and the law of
motion of qt, the optimal savings increase in 1  qt (@S

t
@qt
< 0). This implies that a lower
qE;t+1 caused by Bt
 will result in more savings by the egalitarian planner in the next
generation von Stackelberg game (
@St+1
@qt+1
< 0). This trend continues, increasing the threat
of a transition back to a market-based economy.
Proof of Proposition 2. We derive the e¤ect of the relative strength of market
advocates in some period t on the saving behavior of the egalitarian planner in that
period:
@St
@qt
=  2qt(1  qt)(2qt   1) ln (M;t+1)

> 0 if qt < 0:5
< 0 if qt > 0:5
: (35)
Thus, for any high qt > 0:5 (i.e. any low 1  qt < 0:5), @S

t
@qt
< 0 (i.e. @S

t
@(1 qt) > 0). In
words, the optimal reaction functions of the two types in the von Stackelberg game of
conicting beliefs under communism lead to a progressive decrease of qt. In each period
t a pro-market transition may occur with probability 1  qt.
Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows: a communist system is only feasible
when type Bs are weaker than type As (1   qT < 0:5). Market propaganda that
arises from lower relative e¢ ciency under communism results in a shift of ideology in
the next generation towards the market-oriented type. This induces more savings by
the egalitarian planner as an attempt to restore e¢ ciency through more investment and
accumulation. But more savings at the aggregate level creates a negative externality on
productivity as it is necessarily accompanied by lower available consumption and wages.
Responding to more discontented people by further increasing savings under Lemma 3
only exacerbates the relative ine¢ ciency of the communist regime, making it less and
less sustainable.17 As the convergence of beliefs toward the market ideology continues,
the probability of economic transition increases, and the regime may eventually revert
to the market system. Historically, this is relevant to the Soviet and East European
case, on which we focus the analysis.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamics of the model across generations. To elucidate
it, we briey revisit the events that lead to revolution and back to transition. Under
markets, initial (relative) inequality M;0 > 1 and capitalist savings sBt > 0 in (22)
leads to ln (M;1) > 0 and A0
 > 0 from (20), which itself brings about an increase in
the strength of type As in the next period q1, via (21). According to equation (19) and
Proposition 1 this increases optimal savings by capitalists in the following period, sB1 ,
raising inequality. This creates a continuing cycle towards a communist revolution that
can be summarized as
sBt "! M;t+1 "! At "! qt+1 "! sBt+1 "! M;t+2 "! At+1 "! qt+2 " :::
until a potential revolution occurs (Proposition 1). In the case of revolution, initial
(relative) ine¢ ciency E;T > 1 and central planners savings S

t > 0 satisfying condition
(30) gives ln
 
E;T+1

> 0 and BT
 > 0 from (28), which itself leads to a higher propor-
tion of B type agents in the following period qT+1. According to (25) and Proposition
2, this increases optimal aggregate savings by the egalitarian planner in the following
17Essentially, such a set-up resembles the overinvestment experience in communist countries during
their period of initial industrialization and subsequent attempts to increase future production (and, in
historical context, catch up with the West).
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period, ST+1, raising ine¢ ciency with respect to the market system as long as Lemma
3 holds. This triggers a continuing cycle towards transition back to the market system
that can be summarized as
St "! E;t+1 "! Bt "! qt+1 #! St+1 "! E;t+2 "! Bt+1 "! qt+2 # :::
until a potential transition occurs (Proposition 2). Alternatively, if the regime switch
does not occur and qt falls below qt = 0:5, the communist system stabilizes.
Corollary 1 (Stable Communism) Should market transition not occur for qt < 0:5,
a substantial threat from strong type Bs to overturn the regime induces the leader to
accommodate his strategy in search of a compromise by decreasing aggregate savings,
St , increasing longer-run e¢ ciency (via higher wages and consumption) and potentially
stabilizing the communist system.
Proof. When qt < 0:5, type Bs become su¢ ciently strong and ideologically de-
termined to represent a credible threat to bring down communism. Consequently, the
optimal aggregate savings, St , becomes increasing in qt (that is, decreasing in 1   qt).
See proof of Proposition 2.
The alternative in Corollary 1 arises because for relatively strong type Bs the prob-
ability of a regime change is perceived by the egalitarian planner as credible, thus the
latter adapts his behavior. An increase in the probability of a regime change (qt+1 < qt)
induces a reduction in aggregate savings by the egalitarian planner. This increases
consumption allocations (material well-being), hence productivity and ultimately the
e¢ ciency of the communist system for the range of parameter values where Lemma 3
holds. By maintaining e¢ ciency and reducing the ideological determination of type Bs
to change the status quo, such a reaction by the egalitarian planner can prolong the
communist regime and, potentially, avoid surrendering central planning. Historically,
this resembles the Chinese social market economy, where pro-market economic reforms
were undertaken widely in coexistence with the centralized political system.
Recall that a transition to markets is most likely to occur when qt is near 0:5 where
optimal saving is at its highest. If a transition occurs when qt > 0:5, then the dynamics
of qt move towards a shift back to the previous regime. On the other hand, the regime
change is more likely to persist if it occurs for lower values of qt < 0:5.
Corollary 2 (Stable Capitalism) Should transition occur when qt < 0:5, it is more
likely that the market system persists since the leaders accommodate their strategy in
search of a compromise by decreasing savings, sBt , thereby mitigating inequality.
Proof. When qt < 0:5, type B leaders decrease savings, sBt , as a response to a
higher qt potentially stabilizing the market system. See the proof of Proposition 1
The alternative in Corollary 2 arises because type Bs adapt their behavior. An
increase in the probability of a regime change (qt+1 > qt) induces a reduction in capital
accumulation by type Bs. By reducing income inequality and, hence, the ideological
determination of type As to change the status quo, such a reaction by capital owners
can avoid slipping back towards communism.18 Historically, this seems to have been the
case of social democracies and the welfare state, where democratization of capitalism
and redistribution of income have preserved the market system. Moreover, if transition
occurs when qt becomes low, then the perceived post-transition inequality ln (M;t+1)
18Although we do not explicitly model redistribution, a part of the increase in capitalistsindividual
present consumption brought about by lower savings can be thought of as a transfer to the poor. This is
a concept similar to Galor and Moav (2006), in which capitalists nd it optimal to invest in the human
capital of the poor.
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tends to be lower: many people are involved in the regime change as opposed to a sudden
transition led by a smaller group of people as in Russia, so capital would be shared among
a larger group, higher 1   nt. Therefore, there would not be much di¤erence between
communism and markets in terms of inequality: only ownership becomes private, but
the wealth is in the hands of many and individual savings, sBt , will be low.
[Figure 4 about here]
This convergence of the two polar economic systems can be thought of as either a
stable market economy sustained by a large entrepreneural middle class (Corollary 2)
or a successful social market economy that applies to China (Corollary 1). The phase
diagram in Figure 4 summarizes the overall dynamics of regime switches in propositions
1 and 2, and stability obtained from Lemma 3 and corollaries 1 and 2 in the space
of consumption and the balance of power between the two types in the society. The
shaded area illustrates the region of instability, where the pendulum restores force and
accelerates back to communism.
5 Historical Evidence
Our model critically relies on the three following assumptions: (i) the use of aggregates
in the planners economic calculus, (ii) the lower productivity delivered by a centralized
economy (under Lemma 3), and (iii) the willingness of the lagging economy to catch-
up with the market system. This section shows that these assumptions merely reect
commonly observed facts, grounding our model on historical accounts.
Our rst assumption is that the calculus in a centrally-planned economy is not of
consent, to paraphrase Buchanan and Tullocks (1962) well-known book title, but of
command: economic decisions are taken by higher authorities, which give orders (ob-
jectives) to the lower-tier entities such as farms or plants (Ericson, 2008). As such, a
command or planned economy does not consider individual (or individual-based) deci-
sions, but nation-wide aggregates. The debate about the virtues of one versus the other
has received a lot of attention as early as the well documented debates between Lange
(1956 [1936]) and von Hayek (1940, 1945). Lin (2009) shows how this Soviet-style plan-
ning has endured, notably in the developing countries that have been inuenced by the
ideology or the country (the USSR) that largely sponsored it. Recent studies conrm
that what we have referred to as a misalignment of ownership and control is prevalent
in such systems. Among others, Brixiová and Bulíµr (2003) or Bajona and Locay (2009)
show that basing decisions on economic aggregates is prone to deciencies and lower
e¤orts by private individuals, which results in lower productivity performance. Every-
where, the same ingredients delivered the same recipe, but aggregate planning failed to
deliver a consistent dish. In the words of Li and Yang (2005), probably nowhere else but
in China did such economic management result in a (human) disaster as large as the
one during the Great Leap Forward(19591964), which is an example of communist
orthodoxy trying to harness capital to catch-up with the West.
This logically guides the choice of our second main assumption: the lower productiv-
ity (relative growth potential) of the planned economy described in Lemma 3. Although
it is very di¢ cult to compare the two systems (if only because the Net Material Prod-
uct, not the GDP, was used in communist countries, excluding as a consequence the
services), it has been shown that the Soviet-type economies were less productive than
their Western counterparts. The USSR, for example, obtained a 2.1 per cent trend an-
nual productivity growth per head after WWII, which compares badly with the West,
even after taking into account the losses (and bounce back) due to the war (Harrison,
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1998; Bergson, 1991). Broadberry and Klein (2012) conrm that the situation can be
generalized to the Eastern bloc countries, which they compare to the EEC6 and 9. Wu
(2001) considers the productivity of the Chinese industry, comparing it with the US,
and nds that China was strongly lagging behind. Even more strikingly, he shows that
the average productivity in the nineties (i.e., after the beginning of the reforms) was al-
most twice larger than what had been reached since 1952. And the inferior productivity
relative to market economies is commonly attributed to the deciencies of a command
economy (see, for instance, Litwak, 1993), among which the weakening workersmorale,
due to low consumption possibilities (Bergson, 1991), as in our own modeling and in-
terpretation.
The last main assumption of our analytical set-up is the willingness to catch-up
with the West, an objective which historically led to overinvestment and to a focus on
industry as a lever to reach that goal. USSR leaders repeatedly stated that their goal
was to bring as much comfort to their population as what existed in the West (Bergson,
1991). Harrison (1985) measures the degree of overinvestment and shows this feature
to be even more important in China than in the USSR, while Bergson (1991) draws the
link between the insistence on industry (and especially heavy industries) and the lower
consumption possibilities delivered by the Soviet economy. Easterly and Fischer (1995)
go as far as attributing the decline of the Soviet economy to such overinvestment bursts.
The challenge here is, thus, to consider how China ts in this landscape, given that
its savings rate has been high for the last decades, since the start of the reforms, and
stands at levels that are higher than either in the other developing countries or in the
developed ones (Yang et al., 2012). Although it may not have reached the productivity
level of the Western economies, China has at least been able to follow a particular reform
path that has permitted maintaining such a high level of savings without creating too
much resentment, or reform without losersas referred to in Lau et al. (2000). The
reform has compensated the expected decay of the old industries by aligning incentives
in the collective farms and state-owned rms, hence soothing the impact of the changes
on people, and by liberalizing the more promising industrial sectors, thus promoting
the countrys growth along a dual-track approach(Lau et al., 2000; Lin, 2009). Such
accounts explain why China may be a good case in point with regard to Corollary 1,
with the Communist Party making concessions in unleashing entrepreneurial spirits and
accommodating the strive for economic prot and higher consumption.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical analysis above summarized the rise and fall of communism as a process
of experimenting with a new economic system that failed in most world regions, while
reaching stability  under some concessions  in few others. It also showed how the
same general mechanism we emphasized as driving social evolution could generate, under
certain conditions and under minor regime-dependent specicity, not just the advent of
communism but also its demise, or sometimes prolonged stability. That is, we proposed a
model of long-run economic dynamics as one possible explanation for a principal insight
from the history and the turn of events during the last century and a half.
Our work is in line with the few related formal accounts of political economy na-
ture regarding the processes leading to successful democratization or to dictatorships
succeeding democracy and democracy succeeding dictatorships in unstable societies, in
particular the book by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Our approach is close to their
framework in that we employ all of their three fundamental building blocks, namely:
1. economic-based approach, emphasizing individual economic incentives as de-
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termining political attitudes and that people behave strategically in the sense
of game theory(p. xii);
2. the fundamental importance of conict, where di¤erent groups, sometimes so-
cial classes, have opposing interests over political outcomes(p. xii);
3. political institutionsthat play a central role in solving problems of commitment
by a¤ecting the future distribution of de jure political power(p. xii).
It is interesting to note as well that their example of stable democracy, Britain,
corresponds to our stable capitalism under Corollary 2 and the hypothesis in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) that the extended franchise in the West prevented communism to
happen. Their case of repeated cycles of democratization and dictatorship, Argentina,
relates to our more general metaphor, in propositions 1 and 2, of the pendulum of
economic systems. Their example of a stable nondemocratic regime, Singapore, parallels
our Corollary 1, and its likely relevance to China.
Moreover, our work is also in line with Norths (2005) arguments on the process of
long-run economic change, where institutions are, according to Aoki (2011), social ar-
tifacts that cognitively mediate agentsstrategic interactions and their individual beliefs
in societal games. North characterizes succinctly the nature of this social evolutionary
process as follows:
In contrast to Darwinian evolutionary theory, the key to human evolution-
ary change is the intentionality of the players. (...) Economic change, there-
fore, is for the most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the
actors about the consequences of their actions. The perceptions come from
the beliefs of the players  the theories they have about the consequences
of their actions beliefs that are typically blended with their preferences.
(North, 2005, p. viii)
Our goal with this paper was to capture the perceived reality ! beliefs ! institu-
tions ! policies ! altered perceived realitychain North (2005) emphasized in words
into a coherent and general theoretical construct capable to highlight the social pendu-
lum across economic systems or their convergence using the specic case of communism.
Our model begins with a perceived reality that is unjust for our type A agents,
as they are born unequal and poorer. Their beliefs are thus shaped out by the ideal
of achieving equality, and are propagated by socialization and the spread of ideology
across society. At this initial point, however, the world has never operated a communist
economic system, to which the A types strive. In other words, the society faces huge
(aggregate) ambiguity if it decides to attempt a change in the status quo. The exper-
iment accordingly creates its own institutions and policies, forcing equality in incomes
and a central planning system to replace the role of capitalists and markets. But the
social realities imposed by the revolution and nationalization turn out simply not to
work: all members of the communist region su¤er lower and lower material well-being
due to misaligned incentives resulting from a distorted ownership and control structure.
By abolishing private property and market signals communism forces equality of own-
ership through a centralized allocation that comes at the cost of lower productivity and
poor coordination. While observing as a reference point the rest of the world that has
remained market-based and is performing better, a drive to pro-market reforms the
altered perceived reality reverts the society back to sustainability. Although we con-
clude modeling the chain of social evolution at this point, the pendulum certainly does
not stop here and can either continue to swing back and forth or converge and stabilize.
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Sometimes if not often in history, the society faces the unavoidable challenge to
experiment with its own existence and future under huge ambiguity. With heterogenous
agents, information sets, expectations and interests, it is not always easy to agree on
a commonly shared plan, or at least hope for such a plan to possibly end up success-
fully. Doubts, conicts and ideologies emerge naturally, values and institutions evolve,
responding to evolving realities. At times, the experiment discovers a positive outcome.
And then society nds and settles into a new equilibrium, until the next unprecedented
vital change of the environment. However, when the outcome of such a social experi-
ment is negative, the pendulum of history swings back, or along a spiral, whose circles
constitute a gradation of hard-to-acquire knowledge.
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